(09/08/08) A short analysis of the situation in South Ossetia and Georgia

• 2008-08-18

Since June there were increasing signs that the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was aggravating. Bomb attacks and sudden clashes were taking place more than occasionally in the territories of the two breakaway republics. Some international observers linked these attacks to a new strategy of the Georgian intelligence whose chief had just been appointed. Frustration has been growing in Tbilisi over the years because there has been no progress as regards negotiations between the parties. Russia aimed at accepting the status quo with the de-facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which was unacceptable, though, to the Georgian government eager to restore the territorial integrity of the country.

The Kosovo factor. The day after the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo (15 February) the Georgian government decided to withdraw its contingent from KFOR. In spite of the assurances by the US and the EU that Kosovo is not a precedent it was clear to everybody that this could have been used as a precedent for the other frozen conflicts in Europe. One of the last decisions taken by Putin before leaving office was a presidential decree in March aimed at stepping up relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia providing economic (and political) assistance to the two breakaway republics but stopping short of diplomatic recognition. Moscow has always formally supported the territorial integrity of Georgiaal though in practice has taken steps to weaken it as much as possible. According to the ceasefire agreement of 1992 for South Ossetia and of 1994 for Abkhazia Russia (it was originally the CIS) was tasked of peace-keeping operations. It was clear to everybody that this situation could not last since Russian forces are part of the problem and not of the solution and cannot be seen as neutral.

The Georgian government. Contrary to how he is portrayed by the Western press Georgian president Saakashvili is becoming more and more like one of the many autocrats in the region. Freedom of the press and freedom of media is constantly declining in Georgia. Saakashvili never tone down his statements and always declared that his priority was to get back Abkhazia and South Ossetia by all means. He refused to sign a non-aggression pact with the de-facto regimes of the two breakaway republics. The defence budget of Georgia skyrocketed in the last three years with the American assistance. More than 100 US military advisors are training the Georgian forces.

Russian position. From a strategic and economic point of view there is hardly any interest by Russia for South Ossetia. Abkhazia is strategically much more important for Russia. All the people living in South Ossetia, though, carry a Russian passport which was given to all those who wanted to change their old Soviet passport. Formally, therefore, they are Russian citizens enjoying all the rights of the citizens of the Russian Federation including the one of being defended by the Russian army. Further to this all the top personalities of the South Ossetian regime are KGB people directly controlled by Moscow.

Why the war? Having explored all the diplomatic ways for a political settlement Saakashvili is now trying to get back South Ossetia by force hoping the Russians will not strike back using all of their military power. He is using the “fait accompli” strategy and after Georgian forces gained the control of most of the South Ossetian territory he is now asking for a ceasefire. From a political point of view this could strengthen his position in Georgia though this would probably mean that Abkhazia is lost forever. He is playing a very risky game but I doubt that this was not previously planned and agreed with the Pentagon. Saakashvili is closely tied to the Bush administration.

Georgia’s bid for NATO membership. After last year Bucharest summit the relations between NATO and Georgia have been stepped up. A core of EU countries (Germany and France in particular) vetoed Georgia’s (and Ukraine’s) membership, but are now bound to show, as an alternative, that they fully back the pro-West choice of Tbilisi. Saakashvili is now gambling on the factual support of the US and the EU. As some said Georgian membership would mean a reconfiguration of NATO with the deletion of article 5 of NATO charter which foresees solidarity and assistance between all the member countries.

The EU and Georgia. European diplomacies are not willing to raise the confrontation with Russia because of Saakashvili. Within the European Neighbourhood Policy framework Brussels is deepening the relations with Tbilisi and is about to finalise a deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement. Recently the Political and Security Committee (one of the bodies of the EU dealing with the European and Security Policy) gave the go-ahead for a deeper involvement of the EU in the region following a request of the Georgian government. Last month German foreign minister Steinmeyer visited Georgia and put forward a plan for the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. Needless to say that this was a late initiative since the independence of Kosovo further triggered the independence drive of the two breakaway republics. As European Parliament we called many times the EU to involve itself more actively in conflict-resolution policies in the South Caucasus envisaging the possibility to send an EU-led peace-keeping contingent in the conflict areas siding with the Russian troops.

Paolo Bergamaschi

Advisor for the Greens in Foreign Affairs (European Parliament Committee)