INTRODUCTION: THE AMBITIONS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
I hope that I have never over-sold to this House the achievements of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy or even its potential under the existing Treaty. I have always been acutely conscious of its
limitations. Let me quote briefly from a speech I made almost three years ago, in June 2000:
"In
the important advances achieved in CFSP in the last decade," I said, "the Member States have not given the
Commission a sole right of initiative; nor, in general, have they agreed to abide by majority votes; nor do they
accept that Europe has 'occupied the space', reducing national freedom of action…Foreign policy remains
primarily a matter for democratically elected Member State governments."
That has
never been more evident than over the last few miserable weeks, which have also amply illustrated what I went on
to say that:
" All Member States should acknowledge what those actually doing the work of CFSP have
long understood that mere inter-Governmentalism is a recipe for weakness and mediocrity: for a European foreign
policy of the lowest common denominator. That will become more and more obvious as the Union takes in new
members."
The sorry figure cut by the European Union in recent weeks should not blind
us to the real and remarkable achievements of CFSP over the last decade: in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and in
many other parts of the world. But it should also remind us how far we have to go. Of course, it is possible as
some have suggested for a small group of Member States to act as a driving force to give Europe a coherent, high
profile foreign policy. But without better machinery to harness common political will, they are just as likely
to drive an incoherent high-profile policy. This has not been a good time for those who believe that the way
forward for European foreign policy is to leave things to the big Member States.
ENHANCING THE ROLE OF THE UN
One lesson we can already draw
from the unfolding events is the importance of developing the role and authority of the United Nations. It is in
the interests of the whole world that power should be constrained by global rules, and used only with
international agreement. What other source of international legitimacy but the UN exists for military
intervention? On what other basis is it possible, indeed, to address the problem of weapons of mass destruction?
I am here thinking not just of the particular case of Iraq, but of the wider issue. America's refusal to press
forward with ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hardly strengthens the hand of the IAEA and
others seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology in Iran, North Korea and beyond. I regretted,
too, America's decision to resile so lightly from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. For such decisions and
there have been many send a dangerous signal about the value that the US places on international commitments.
And that, surely, is a critical battle lost in what some call the 'war against terrorism'.
For I find it hard to conceive how the terrorist threat can be confronted effectively except
through international co-operation and disciplines. Impressive work has already been done within the EU and
through the UN Counter-terrorism Committee. We should continue to help countries which find it hard to meet
their counter-terrorism obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. And we should continue to work
for a less unequal world for example in the WTO Doha Development Agenda; by carrying forward the Monterrey
decisions on development financing; and by implementing the Johannesburg decisions on sustainable development.
As a general rule, are wars not more likely to recruit terrorists than to deter them? It is hard to build
democracy at the barrel of a gun, when history suggests that it more usually the product of long internal
development within a society.
Because of the UN's unique role as a source of
legitimacy, it is of the greatest importance that if a war is waged in Iraq, the UN should authorise the
decision to attack. If, tragically, the position of the UN remains ambiguous (if, for example, authority for an
attack rested on Resolution 1441, but without explicit Security Council confirmation that Iraq's failure fully
to comply constituted a casus belli), then it is still likely to be desirable that the UN should provide the
framework as soon as possible for humanitarian assistance that may be necessary thereafter;
that it should oversee the emergence of the new Iraqi polity, driven by the people of Iraq themselves; and
that it should help to co-ordinate the international reconstruction effort that will certainly be required. But
it would be better (who can seriously dispute this) if, a huge "if" we were able to disarm Saddam Hussein
preferably by inspections.
EU HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND OTHER
CO-OPERATION
The EU is a massive donor in the Balkans and in Afghanistan,
and we are already the largest humanitarian donor in Iraq. If it comes to war, we shall certainly have to step
up that help, not just to the victims of the conflict, but to those who may seek refuge from it. The Commission
has been engaged in intensive contacts with UN organisations and with countries neighbouring Iraq about how we
might best contribute on the humanitarian front. €15m has already been set aside, but we may well need to go
further drawing, if necessary, on the budget's emergency reserve.
It will be
essential that, with other international assistance agencies, the EU should be free to give independent and
impartial help. A strict separation will need to be maintained between military action and assistance in order
to preserve the so-called 'humanitarian space'. That objective will be much easier to achieve if the UN is
recognised, at an early stage, as the lead assistance co-ordinator.
Immediate
humanitarian help is one thing but the demands upon us will certainly extend much beyond that. As you are all
too well aware in this House, Europe's external relations budget is already heavily committed. It will be very
difficult in any circumstances to launch massive new programmes in Iraq and in the neighbourhood of Iraq. But it
will be that much more difficult for the EU to co-operate fully and on a large scale also in the longer-term
reconstruction process if events unfold without proper UN cover and if the Member States remain divided.
When I have made this point in the past I have sometimes been accused of issuing a threat of
EU nonco-operation if the United States chooses to proceed without UN backing, on the principle suggested by Tom
Friedman from the sign in a china shop: "If you broke it, you own it." But that is not my point. I am making,
rather, a simple observation of fact: that if it comes to war, it will be very much easier to persuade you the
EU budgetary authority to be generous if there is no dispute about the legitimacy of the military action that
has taken place; about the new political order that emerges thereafter; or about who is in charge of the
reconstruction process. I am not making a quasi-legal point. I am simply offering a political judgement of no
great novelty or sagacity. It seems pretty obvious.
MINIMISING COLLATERAL
DAMAGE
I am gravely concerned and I know that many in this House share my
concerns about the potential collateral damage of recent events, and of a war, if it comes to that. Our joint
efforts should be directed to trying to minimise those potential effects. I am thinking not just of the death
and destruction that might be wrought by war itself, or of the destabilising consequences for Iraq's immediate
neighbours but of potential damage, for example to the authority of the United Nations; to NATO; and to
transatlantic relations, which are going through a very difficult passage. In all these contexts we must look
beyond the immediate arguments and remind ourselves of our long-term interests to co-operate and to strengthen
the flawed but necessary apparatus of international governance.
But there are three
other areas where we should also work to reduce collateral damage from recent events.
The first is the Common Foreign and Security Policy itself, which has suffered a severe setback because
Member States on both sides of the debate have chosen to take firm national policy positions as if they spoke
for the European Union as a whole. We must not be disheartened by this setback. There have been similar
divisions within the United States, and even within the US Administration, but these do not pull the country
apart because in the end the President is empowered to speak for the nation as a whole. As a Union of
independent nations we do not enjoy that luxury. But that is reason to redouble our efforts to build an
effective CFSP, not to abandon them. As we return to the work we shall find, perhaps, a little more humility
even among the large Member States who can surely see how much they have damaged their common enterprise and how
much they have reduced their common influence as a result of public squabbling;
A
second European project that risks being hurt by recent events if we do not work actively to sustain it, is the
cause of enlargement. I think it is particularly damaging that disagreements over Iraq have been allowed to
over-shadow the debate about enlargement. We should not call into question the European vocation of countries
simply because of their views on the Iraq crisis. Let us assure the acceding countries that we continue to look
forward eagerly to their imminent membership.
But on the other side of the argument
let us acknowledge that those who join our Union are making an existential choice. They are not declaring
themselves for Europe and against the United States. Emphatically not. But, in the words of the Treaty, they are
accepting a responsibility to "refrain from action…likely to impair [the effectiveness of the Union] as a
cohesive force in international relations." The present members may have set a bad example but that does not
reduce the responsibility on all members, including the acceding states, to meet that Treaty obligation.
Finally, I want to say a word about Israel and Palestine. What happens if there is a war in
Iraq? Let us suppose, let us pray, that it is brief. Let us further suppose that all the worries expressed about
the consequences in terms of stability of the country prove unfounded. Let us, in short, put all or most
anxieties to one side.
I want to ask two questions. First, will the peace that breaks
out drive Palestinians and Israelis into an historic reconciliation? The state of the Palestinians was described
last week by Peter Hansen, Commissioner General of the UN Relief and Works Agency. "The stark fact is", he
wrote, "that almost a quarter of Palestinian children are suffering from acute or chronic malnutrition for
purely man-made reasons. No drought has hit Gaza and the West Bank, no crops have failed and the shops are often
full of food. But the failure of the peace process and the destruction of the economy by Israel's closure
policy have had the effect of a terrible natural disaster".
Second, in the aftermath
of a war, will America (the leader of a UN backed operation or a more limited coalition) take a much more
proactive role in forging an Israeli-Palestinian peace? We have been told that will happen. European leaders
have been told that will happen: that the road map will see the light of day before we all run out of road. I
sincerely hope that is so. I genuinely fear the outcome if war in Iraq is followed by another year or more of
violence in Palestine and Israel. That would further inflame opinion in the Islamic world. To defeat terrorism,
it is said by some to be necessary to defeat Saddam Hussein. That may or may not be true some of us are at the
very least agnostic on that point. But what I am absolutely sure about is that to invade Iraq while failing to
bring peace to the Middle East would create exactly the sort of conditions in which terrorism would be likely to
thrive. And none of us would be immune from the consequences.