(24/04/08) Some key points about the visit of the AFET-committee delegation to Kosova - 17-19 april 2008

• 2008-04-24
• Europa in de wereld

It was an intense visit with a full-schedule programme. We arrived late on 17 April. Meetings started, therefore, on Friday morning and continued the following day. On Saturday afternoon, before leaving, we visited a small Serbian village in the Gracanica enclave not far from Prishtina. Here following my brief conclusions.

- EULEX. The deployment of the 2000 people foreseen for the ESDP Rule of Law mission in practice has not yet started. At Council level Member States cannot find a juridical basis. Some EU legal experts argue that the transfer of authority from UNMIK to EULEX falls within UNSC resolution 1244 and that, therefore, a new resolution is not indispensable. They say, anyway, that this transfer should be authorised by the UN Secretary General in accordance with art.10 of UNSC 1244 that tasks him to establish the modalities of the international civilian presence. Contrary to what informally said to Solana at the end of last year, though, due to the pressure of Russia and Serbia Ban Kyi Moon is not willing today to formally endorse the European mission. This means that as of today we are nowhere. The 4-month transition period is screwed up.

- UNMIK. Over these last months it was widely expected the gradual phasing out of UNMIK. It will not be so. The Council has decided to end pillar IV, which was under EU responsibility, by June 30 but for the other three pillars it is very likely that this won't happen. Russia and Serbia want to keep UNMIK in place especially in the Serbian enclaves. This could be interpreted as a first step towards partition. Talks are ongoing between the parties in order to find a way out. My impression is that there won't be any official handover between UNMIK and EULEX but there will be in the end an accord of coexistence trying not to overlap each other's competences. What is sure is that UNMIK compound will not be given to EULEX as it was originally planned.

- International Civilian Office (ICO). It has already been set up and is almost fully operational. The International Civilian Representative (ICR) Peter Feith is also the EU Special Representative for Kosovo. Its task is to monitor annexes 2, 3 and 5 of the Ahtisaari's Plan (AP), help identify capacity gap and stick to the principle of ownership. ICR has already certified the constitution adopted on 9 April by the parliament of Kosovo. The real work of ICO will start after June 15 when the constitution enters into force. UNMIK is a governing body while ICO is supervising the implementation of the AP and the transition between UNMIK and the Kosovo government. ICR competences are similar to ones of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia though he does not act under a UN mandate. ICO, in facts, refers to the International Steering Group made up of 12 EU countries plus the US and Turkey. ICR can intervene when minority laws are violated and can nullify law that are not in line with the AP.

- OSCE. It will continue its mission but after Russia threatened to stop the mission it has to remain status-neutral and cannot refer to the AP.

- Kosovo Institutions. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 17 February both government and parliament seem to be catching up with their daily tasks. The parliament was able to adopt 19 laws integrating further the principles of the AP. Albanian and Serbian are the two official languages of Kosovo. Prime Minister Thaci stressed the fact Kosovo has now stable multiethnic institutions and that the problems are limited to North Mitrovica. He pointed out that his government is committed to implementing democratic standards and the rule of law and to fighting organized crime.

- Recognition process. Contrary to the expectations the process of international recognition is going on very slowly. As of today only about 40 countries have recognised the independence of Kosovo. The pressure of Russia is very strong and Serbia is actively lobbying everywhere in order to convince third governments not to take such action.

- The situation of minorities. Except for the Serbs and partly for the Romas the other minority groups we met seem to be relatively satisfied about the way things are going. Serbs have 10 members in parliament and two ministers in the government while the other non majority communities (Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turkish, Egyptian and Ashkali) have one. We had a chance to meet both the representatives of the Serbian community who are now cooperating with the Kosovo institutions and those who are resisting or refusing to recognise the new situation.

- Serbia. Two thirds of the Serbs live South of the Ibar river. Those are the ones who are more realistic and cooperative and willing to find a compromise. Their situation has definitely improved. They dare now go out of their enclaves and move freely when necessary. They point out, though, that they don't feel safe enough to conduct a normal life. The pressure from Serbia is anyway very strong. Belgrade still pays their salaries and pensions. They feel sometimes they are used by Belgrade. On 11 May Serbia decided to hold elections also in the Serbian populated parts of Kosovo. Since according to the AP Kosovo Serbs are entitled to double citizenship voting at the Serbian general elections falls under their rights. The problem is that they are supposed to vote also for the municipal elections and in this case only UNMIK is entitled to call them. UNMIK has already stated that these municipal elections are invalid but will not do anything to stop them.

Conclusions

EULEX mission is the most important ESDP mission so far undertaken by the EU. It will sure turn out to be an important and decisive test of the effectiveness of the EU foreign policy. Unfortunately the conditions in which this mission is about to start are far from clear and favourable. No juridical basis, possible competition with the UN, interference of Russia, boycott of a part of the Serbian community, de-facto secession of North Mitrovica.

After 11 May the situation could look better if Tadic and his pro-European coalition win the elections in Serbia. In case Nationalists and Radicals win the situation could really precipitate. Offering Kosovo a European perspective is not a decisive factor at present capable to straighten things up. Under the Ahtisaari Plan Serbians enjoy more rights than any other minority in the world but most of them seem not to know it.

The economic situation is bad. Corruption and organised crime contribute to worsening things. As to the latter a EULEX official explained to us that the fight against organised crime is a highly political and sensitive issue. They have no means to do it and would need the collaboration of the European governments. As regards the de-facto partition of North Mitrovica UNMIK has neither the force nor the will to intervene. Partition could set off drives towards Greater Albania further destabilizing the region. Russia definitely plays a role in this process. If the confrontation fades away and Moscow is more constructive the situation will surely improve.

I have the impression that Kosovo is part of a package of sensitive questions for Russia that include the anti-missile shield and NATO enlargement. The present US administration has no intention to come to terms with Moscow. Is it possible, though, to deal with security in Europe without involving Russia?