COP17 - Het jongste nieuws uit Durban (Engelstalig)

Outcome is in sight: The Roadmap or Durban platform for future action has instead of the option ''or a legal outcome'', the text has now ''an agreed outcome with legal force'' . The mandate is clearly somewhat ambiguous regarding the bindingness of the outcome, but we think it is not in our interest to spin it negative or downplay it. The timeframe for implementing the future framework remains ''from 2020''. In our communications that's going to be our main line of criticism, the timeline is not sufficient to spur necessary climate action by 2020 to put us on a path avoiding dangerous climate change. On the KP side it is not ratifiable KP 2CP, but a decision with political bindingness. Also the decision on the length of the period is deferred to the next CMP. The plenaries are not over yet, debate has just started regarding amendments requested by Nicaragua and Bolivia... Obviously all could still fall. Russia already questioned the role and status of documents, wanted to have it on paper. who's negotiating with who here.. [LCA package has been approved. President just started the CMP and consideration of the KP decisions..] Durban climate conference (COP 17) 7bis The KP cover text has not improved. Conditionalities relating to 20/30% have been made explicit again. The EU is asking for 8 year period instead of 5 years, linked to Roadmap decision timeline. Looks therefore like the Roadmap / LCA cover text has taken a serious turn for the worse: with 2020 timeline in the paper as well as ''legal outcome'' as an option a side ''protocol or legal instrument under the Convention'' . Legal outcome can be everything and or nothing, it certainly does not need legally binding outcomes. India has continuously put that option forward in the discussions. Combined with 8 year period the package has just moved to hugely increased uncertanty about the legal value of any new instrument that could be the result of the new process as well as locking in timelines that almost inevitably take us to a path to dangerous climate change. The other work done to try to bridge ambition gap looks pretty meaningless judging by the enthousiasm for any concrete ambition here. Connie Hedegaard has given statements coming in to the hall saying EU will not accept ''legal outcome'' or 2020. Remains to be seen if the text will be improved at the LCA side. The AWG KP plenary were suspended few times and proceeded to quite a negative debate. None of the new documents are available on the web yet, the mood in the room is pretty angry. The EU also negotiated a change to the forest management text to take care of a concern for Finland, Sweden and Slovakia. It is a further relaxing of the text although it would have implications only to Finland Sweden Slovakia and possibly Bulgaria (not Russia and Canada for example). The AWG KP chair tried to conclude with a suggestion that given it is not likely that the document receives consensus in the AWG, he will issue the text to the CMP under his own responsibility (not as AWG KP outcomes) . The debate continued for at least another hour.. EU proposed that AWG Chair put in brackets both 2017 and 2020 linked to the Durban package. EU said that the date that EU can agree to depens when the new instrument will be entering into force, saying EU does not mind earlier but the dates are linked. It does not look likely that the EU LULUCF point is included in the chair's text, and remains to be seen if it is moved at CMP plenary. Saudis, Venezuela, Nicaragua in particular were slamming the EU and the draft decision for lack of ambition. Grenada, PNG, Colombia, Kenya and Brazil regretted the lack of ambition and the non legally binding nature of the KP 2cp, they also applauded EU's openess to go forward and supported the chair's proposal how to take issue forward. The chair said that the time was past for amending the text at the AWG but reminded that Parties can propose amendments at the CMP plenary. AWG LCA just started. The new text is still not available!! The COP is far from being over, but for the moment it does not look too good. Durban climate conference (COP 17) 7

10.12.2011

Big confusion. Indaba last night was supposed to discuss the new versions of the chapeau decisions for the LCA and KP released at around 24h. The discussions had gotten stalled about procedure with Saudis trying to stall progress and tie ministers to endless debates to just prevent any constructive outcome presumably.

The chapeau decision on LCA side, what EU calls the roadmap is very good (as reported late last night). The KP text that was publicly available only later on, has been watered down significantly. It does not represent chapeau for decisoins on amendments of the KP, but a political decision saying KP will continue. This is not likely to be acceptable to the developing countries - and is a surprise to all as no one was really supposed to be asking for weakening the text, apart from possibly NZ and Australia. [Conspiracy theorist could think the nationality of the AWG KP chair (NZ) could have something to do the changes. The views of those MS that are not happy in reality to go to another KP period, as well as parts of the Commission who share the KP aversion, are probably also well known to the negotiators despite the public openess to go for ratifiable KP 2CP.]

The EU inability to decide its position and negotiate on AAUs is polluting the picture on possible scenarios from Durban. If we cannot decide internally on AAUs we cannot agree to KP rules, which means QUELROs (the actual numbers in tonnes of CO2 eq) cannot be decided and de facto we are in a two step approach. Some EU member states are very reluctant to agree to KP amendments without knowing the rules - the extent of the loopholes and possibility for some countries to benefit financially from the climate regime. However if EU is not able to agree to KP amendments, which is the ''ratifiable'' KP that is the main ask of developing countries, AOSIS and other vulnerable countries cannot agree to the Roadmap.

Attached the new chapeau texts, KP one including the linked decisions on LULUCF etc, as well as the paper on LCA decisions that are part of the package and assumed to be adopted as COP decisions. There is also a leftover LCA document with the working document texts with remaining brackets included, where work is assumed to continue.

The LULUCF rules in the draft decision are bad. Projected baselines and 3,5% possible credits from forest management per year per Party's annual allowed emissions.

The long term finance issues remain completely open, with a decision to discuss sources during 2012 with a view to ''contribute to the aims to scale up the mobilisation of climate change finance after 2012''.

The issue of shared vision or decision on a global climate goal is referred to a process to look at the peak year and global 2050 target.

The plenary is postponed to 12h30 according to the latest information.

* * *

Durban climate conference (COP 17) 6

9.12.2011

Last night ministers continued in the Indaba until past midnight and further on in smaller groups until 4am Friday morning. The discussions were held on the basis of a table of options for outcomes (legally binding or decisions, based on Bali Action Plan or not, timelines etc) and big picture paper attached. EU has spoken in favour of the first option or a combination of the first and third option, NGOs have said options 1 and 2a would be acceptable to them. EU considers that the options 2 a,b, and c all assume a continuation of 2 track approach beyond the second commitment period of KP, which is inacceptable to the EU.

In the morning big questions are still up in the air. According to one seasoned negotiator, it is ''clear there is no agreement to say the legally binding agreement is concluded by 2015''. At the same time there is no consensus to close off that possibility. The advisors of the ministers arriving to EU coordination this morning were giving 50%-80% chances there being a deal on the Roadmap. What is not clear is whether it is sufficient for EU to go to fully ratifiable KP second commitment period. EU ministers seem to have decided to stay tough, unusually they even issued a statement where they commented the previous nights negotiations saying: '' These negotiations did not bring movement from the side of the major economies. We noted only a few positive messages, including from Brazil, and from our hosts — the Republic of South Africa. The EU will not support an outcome which is not going to properly address the urgent need for action and clear decisions mapping out next steps that would deliver the 2 C objective we need.We are still ready, waiting.''

The strategy of issuing such a statement wasn't unanimously applauded by all EU ministers, and created some negative reactions from African countries.

Apparently text on LULUCF options is ready to go to ministers, with all of the main elements of the African proposal still on the table (limits on the use of forest management credits). On the question of AAUs the EU has not been able to come to an internal position. However Commissioner Hedegaard when confident when answering to the press that an agreement would be found if other issues are solved. In the issues related to REDD+ the small group discussions still at technical level collapsed early in the morning due to disagreement relating to the role of private finance and markets.

In the early afternoon a first package of the key decisions was released by the COP presidency (attached). The EU ministers convened to discuss it rejected it, with several concerns regarding lack of explict references to legally binding agreement as outcomes and commitments by all countries. The draft as circulated certainly will not be sufficient for EU to go to ratifiable KP 2CP.

A lot of time seems to be lost in getting ministers around the table to discuss the paper. There was an attempt to try to get a smaller group of ministers together at 16h00 but then AOSIS said it needed more time to study the proposal then there was confusion of meeting rooms and finally the text was taken to the Indaba of 56 Ministers that started almost an hour late of scheduled 18h00. The issues linked to long term finance have finally also moved to ministerial level consultations. [The technical level negotiations were going nowhere, the G77 China was represented by Mrs. Bernaditas Muller of the Philippines, a very polarising figure in the UNFCCC negotiations and ofcourse US and some other parties have not had any mandate to move beyond Cancun agreement language].

Some criteria to assess an outcome from Durban:

Climate ambition / mitigation

Does it help to spur climate action globally?

Does the outcome help us move EU to step up its climate effort?

Do we have processess to assess and act to close the gap between current pledges and 2C objective?

Finance

aside the Green Climate Fund, is there progress in mobilising the sources for action in adaptation and mitigation in developing countries?

?@

Implementation

Implementation of existing legally binding framework under KP (are we complying with the obligation to come with new targets for 2CP?)

what are the implications to the multilateral process.

What has been remarkable in this COP is the emergence of the vulnerable countries, the AOSIS, LDCs and African group as a distinguished voice, with some credit probably also due to EU diplomatic efforts. Some of the progressive representative within the EU are arguing in favour of accepting some ambiguity in the outcome on the Roadmap as long as the outcomes we are hoping for are not excluded and that we see the process going forward. The analysis is that if we allow the process to go ahead, the voices from within G77 that are on our side will only grow stronger and we can expect progress if we do not push the process off track.

?@

* * *

COM briefing to the EP delegation (Friday at 12)

In the COM briefing today at 12h Connie Hedegaard explained to MEPs how the night's negotiations had been taken forward; first at the big Indaba of 56 Parties and then in a smaller group of 28 ministers at the initiative of the EU and some parties who thought that ministers presence was not getting capitalised. They urged the COP president to come forward with a package for final deal, she should propose it under her authority. It was not likely that the big issues could be taken forward at expert level as ministers are present and the options represent political choices.

EU remains ready to take a ratifiable KP second commitment period, but it is not enough to begin a process on 2020 without dates or commitment to legally binding outcome.

Hedegaard adviced against voices suggesting postponement of decisions to RIO + 20. With such strategies we can give up any hope of achieving progress in Durban.

Answering questions Hedegaard said China had been open to ending negotiations in 2017 and taking legally binding commitments for themselves after 2020. The EU sticks to 2015 which is also important to keep OASIS on our side, they want to have 2012. However she was fairly confident that timetable would not end up being the main difficulty.

On the issue of AAUs, Hedegaard was clearly very frustrated. The EU has been spending hours and hours in Durban discussing the issue internally. It is ridiculous when key persons time should be better spent here talking to other delegations. She said if the miracle should happen, we cannot have this issue block an agreement.

Jos Delbeke said they had come close to an agreement which could fly, he said it was not perfect but manageable. He said it is important not to undermine EU domestic legislation. A solution will be to disassociate carryover and its use. Given the issue has become so strongly politicised, the idea is to allow for generous carryover and restrict its use. Political fudge if you like..

EU is ready go to ratifiable KP 2CP but not at any price. EU is also ready to let the talks crash here. Asked about finance,

Hedegaard mentioned the provisional pledges made by Germany (45 million) Denmark (15 million) and Brits for the new green climate fund, when it is operational, and said EU has been able to put forward a figure of 77 million in bilaterals. Member States coming forward is clearly helpful bring matters forward.

The EU PRESIDENCY briefing MEPs half an hour earlier had put forward a much more pessimistic spin. They were saying that EU proposals did not have support and that at best two step process of ratification and adoption of KP second commitment period numbers.

* * *

Durban climate conference (COP 17) 5

8.12.2011

The ministerial indabas were delayed and had not started at 21:40 while rumours and spinning by different delegations intensified on positions and potential deals.

Several EU ministers invited press to hear convergence of views between EU, LDCs and African group as well as Island States, sending ripples accross delegations and negotiation groups. Rumour has it that Brazil has been forthcoming to support EU proposal for 2015 timeline, while according to another, Umbrella Group (Australia, NZ, Japan, Canada, Norway) is changing strategy to agree to 2015 but linked to mitigation agenda only, without reference to adaptation, funds etc [which would be certain to be rejected by India et al, but leave them with the blame of failure instead of Umbrella group Parties..]. In the meanwhile the US delegation has backtracked on Todd Stern's statements made in a press conference, claiming that his comments have been misunderstod or misrepresented to agree to EU proposal for a Roadmap [this while most of the press conference he had tried to refute claims of US blocking agreement and delaying climate action...].

Feelings among environmentalists are somewhat depressed. No matter how you look at it, even the best possible outcome is not at all adequate for the climate reality where are in. And the likelyhood of having agreement by 2015 with commitment to start with implementation of a new more comprehensive framework before 2020 (say 2018) and having KP CP with 5 year period with a 25-40% aggregate adequacy/gap check [which could be a lever for hiking EU domestic target], look minute if not zero.

At the same time, there is a real risk of the negotiations locking in to a low level of ambition. Some NGOs consider 8 year commitment period to go to far in such locking, and have stated they prefer no outcome rather than a post 2020 timeline. Proposals on review for commitments may sound good but many who have followed the discussions are sceptical where such reviews have never delivered higher ambition before.

Also the KP 2CP targets EU is prepared to sign up to here are weaker than the climate package, and do not help to push the EU to a 30% target. Instead of spurring more climate action, the deal here could lead to EU accumulating more hot air credits - which will again pose problems to integrity of future targets... [I do not think there is a real risk that the current internal EU legislation would be weakened even if the AAU rules adopted here would be weak. There is bigger risk that likely bad LULUCF rules will have a negative influence on future EU legislation.]

Below notes from the informal stocktaking plenary, Presidency briefing and US flip flopping press spin. In the end also partial notes from the Indaba at technical/lead negotiator level that took place this afternoon.

* * *

At the informal stocktaking plenary in the morning, COP president reported on the progress made and informed that she had asked the minister of Botswana to facilitate shared vision consultations, New Zealand regarding mitigation both for developed and developing countries, Equador for adaptation committee, Venezuela for response measures and UK minister Chris Huhne to facilitate agreement on issues related to the review.

She informed that indaba would be convened at technical / lead negotiator level to work on the big picture. She pleaded to delegations not to go into discussion but to continue the work. India and Kazakstan asked for the floor; India to request that ministerial consultations be started on the issue of finance, long term finance in particular. Kazakhstan informed that if their proposal for amending Annex B (with the weak target allowing for hot air carry over) would not reach consensus, they would not defer and would insist on their right based on rule 21 and article 7 to proceed to a vote.

* * *

PRES briefing to the EP delegation (Wednesday 10.00-11.00)

Polish Presidency minister briefed the EP delegation about the issues at stake in the negotiations. He said that the purpose was to agree to pursue a legally binding agreement in essence not just in form. After EU has shown flexibility by indicating it is willign to maintain KP provided the conditions are met, there is movement but the talks are difficult.

Asked about AAUs, the minister responded that the issue of environmental integrity and AAUs had given to technical group within the EU. When pressed whether Poland will accept the result of the technical experts coordination, the Minister said that Poland will accept since the group can find agreement only with consensus.

The minister insisted that during meetings with big parties, AAU issue was never mentioned. He said it is emotional issue in this room between Europeans but not major negotiating issue. He said they are working on a unified EU position.

The minister said that AAUs represent financial assets. He reminded that today Prime ministers meetings were meeting in Europe with much more difficult tasks than we are discussing here. AAUs represent potential public income. Minister said he does not have a right to resign from such revenues. The countries asking for Poland and others to resign from the income do not have such assets in their pocket. According to him environmental integrity is not linked to number but conditions how to use the revenue. In Poland the revenues are earmarked for environment protection.

He continued to defend his government's position sayingg that Poland agreed climate package which results mainly in reductoins in new Member States and within those countries Poland has the biggest effort.

He was asked whether EU ministers were preparing and discussing failure in Durban and if it was true which would be the circumstances of failure.

Polish minister said that he thinks in such difficult negotiations you need to have a credibility. Need to be ready even for failure, otherwise what is a position. He reassured that this is not the mood in EU minister coordination to accept failure. The essence of EU assessment is linked to the legally binding umbrella for all major economies, commitment need to be legally binding to be serious.

The state secretary took over from Polish minister to respond to question about UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon's comments that legally binding agreement is out of reach in Durban. She confirmed that Moon is completely right. We are trying to push to have a process leading to legally binding agreement. But reaching the binding agreement here is not possible.

The COM briefing to EP delegation foreseen in the evening was cancelled.

* * *

The US delegation was having a bad day. A member of civil society staged a protest before/during Todd Stern's High Level segment intervention. Right after the statement, in the US press conference at 12h30, Stern spent most of the time trying to refute the prevailing perception that US is blocking progress and wants to delay climate action beyond 2020.

He said that it was off base, a mistake and simply wrong to suggest that US proposing that we delay action till 2020. Ster said that countries like US, China, the EU and many others are busy implement targets they committed to in Cancun. He expressed his wish that the international negotiations would be rapidly settling on details of the green climate fund, tech center network, adaptation committee. He said US is working hard to ramp up the funding to reach 100 billion [Really? Who do they think they are kidding?!].

He said of the kind of Roadmap EU has called for, ''we are supportive''. A future regime, whether it ends up being legally binding or not, we are supportive of promptly starting process to move forward.

He was evasive about the specific questio about bunkers and IMO is the body charged with regulating shipping and is the right context for discussions.

Pressed by journalist again about the perceived blocking of progress, Stern was saying that time out is not at all what US is calling for. He said that in Cancun we reached ann agreement which is not legally binding but covers 80% of emissions compared to 15% the Kyoto Agreement discussed here might cover. Stern said that what is embedded in Cancun agreement so much more meaningful in terms of emissions reductions than KP that there is no contest.

Regarding the new regime negotiations Stern repated that EU has called for a roadmap and said ''we support that''. That US is blocking a legally binding agreement not true. We made a proposal, to the cop for a full legally binding agreement which calls legally binding to apply to all major economies that would need to be covered for climate to be tackled effectively.

?@

Stern said: You can run around and pretend that behind this firewall, you are going to take 30 or 35 percent of global emissions and fix the problem. But you know what? You’re not. So what the U.S. has been doing over the last two years, with all due respect, has been showing the leadership necessary to try to direct this process into the 21st century.

Later on in the evening the US delegation backtracked on his statements with the following press release:

From: "U.S. Press Office COP-17"uspresscop17@gmail.com

Date: December 8, 2011 8:06:59 PM GMT+02:00

Subject: Statement Regarding Todd Stern's Press Conference

Please attribute the following statement to Emily Cain, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State.

"Todd Stern said in his press conference today that the United States could support a process to negotiate a new climate accord. He did not say that the United States supports a legally binding agreement as the result of that process. The EU has

supported both a process and the result being a legally binding agreement."

The webcast of the press conference is available on the UNFCCC website and the transcript is also available at http://usgreenafrica.state.gov/?p="960" .

* * *Indaba at negotiator level on 'the bigger picture'

Switzerland : Reference to 1/CP. 13 relate to the options 2,3,4, first part 5. the reference should be added, however not to option 1 or second part of 5.

India. Agree China regarding context options are and endorse the views of China. Regarding timeline, when to begin is linked to forum. AWG LCA extended, and elaboration after, for the post 2020. Would like to add 'in accordance with provisions of the UNFCCC.

US : In option 5 after arrangements there should be 'or'.

China . Tasks shoud be in plural, not just single task. Option 2,3,4, first part 5 refer to the context of Bali action plan, and the need to complete that asap.So that we can start something for the period after 2020.

Option 1 mix something that would link proposals under 17 is in different context. These are not options for the same thing, should be made clear. Form to reflect outcome of bap and additional options - should be in different groups. Should not confuse various tasks together.

Marshall islands . In relation to option 1 concern. US remarks. For us this should not be separated from work BAP. we assume this is the final agreed outcome of BAP. option 2 legally binding outcome under the Convention. legal instrument agreed within.

Option 3. concerned about confusing ministers. does this fall within framework under the conventions?

Legal outcome to us is confusing. What trying to do here to finally deliver clarity. Bringing in options that further cloud that objective not welcome. Has been key impediment to progress under LCA.

Brazil.

Would like a clarification: option 5 opens some doors, closer to what my minister is interested for this process. Close with decisions, and then open process.

Mexico [ facilitator legal form group]. echo Marshal islands, share views. Option one clear option to ministers

another legally binding instrument, would be amendment to the convention or a protocol.

Gambia. C oncerned with option 3. What legal outcome is. We did not get an answer.

EU. clarity minister. Option 5 should reflect whole option 1 and follow OR as US said. Agree with Mexico what is legally binding instrument.

xx refer to AOSIS Marshall island. support entirely.

with regard to option 1. some confusions.

art 17 and amendment route. art 17 several proposals have been made, one from US one AOSIS for example. Does not as option preclude a link to BAP. If option 1 without link to BAP, then there should also have option art 17 pursuant BAP and with final agreed outcome being protocol under art 17.

New Zealand . comment option 1 and the question of 'pursuant to BAP'. NZ support for it that it ws not necessarily as pursuant to BAP.

US . seems we are getting more confusion than clarity. seems the way the optons organise themselves:

1) complete Bali agreed outcome in a particular legal form, legal instrument, protocol or set of secision.

2) lets do something legal, but not necessarily linked to BAP.

substantively different.

3) combination of the two : finish bali through set of decisions and then do something which might or might not be legal binding.

Australia. our approach this phase. Not relegate the merits. Support separating option 1. In attempt to knock off options we are beyond the opportunity, we'd need to convince colleagues that their dear option goes away. Make options digestable as possible .

Think it would be better to present packages rather than real multiple choice (not possible/likely to combine all options with another). Not try to relitigate. Present clusters.

Facilitator we would do such a one pager. More digestable.

India. Regarding the option of legal outcome. Wanted to address that, I've been lobbied on this. The aim is not to prejudge. Protocol, treaty (outside convention)... Legal document, the option gives flexibility, Parties can look open-minded way. Important to leave the option in. CDM was established through COP decision in Marrakesh. As a legal outcome.

Switzerland . Two schools of thought. First on is to continue BAP and bring to legal outcome, other school assumes we are concluding Bali now and we start a new process which will bring us to legal result.

Option 1, we are doing something new.

Options 2,3, 4 are based on first school, continuation of BAP

A combination of the two, 5 we conclude here BAP and after we start a new process twds.

Russia . Our discussions on the options are like theological colloquims in the middle ages. Concur with US different school of thoughts. What we think. Outcome Durban we should not shy away from clear language. Durban should be historical milestone, wrap up what we could achieve under BAP, and start a new to come to comprehensive agreement

Singapore. Two scools of thought. Commentng on Australia. option 1 does not say that it is NOT pursuant to BAP. Some proposals put forward by parties are and some are not. Art 17 does in itself does not mean that it is independent. Option 1 should be split into two to fit into that school of thought.

Gambia. LDCss national circumstances in various ways. Imply we will implement Cancun as set of decisions? not acceptable to us. What happens from now up to 2020. Something implement Cancun up to 2020 in a legally binding instrument. Next few years are our concern.

Bolivia. besides the work we have KP track. Complete tasks BAP. Related the configuration of regime, institutions, fund, adaptation committee, technology committee, ctcn. Tasks not finished yet, hope some will be finished here. Iimplies we have to continue but not contradictory with option 1. LCA should be part of legally binding instrument. If protocol most coherent, has to be clear has to be legally binding and under the Convention. Do not see contrast with 1 and even 2.

Option 5 worried to put the end of task 2020 or even after. Should not to forget that mitigation is also very important. Have not advanced enough. Compliance related to LCA is also missing.

Switzerland . option 1 and 2, and schools thoughts. Option 2 could also be splitted, and add develop and finalise pursuant to BAP

EU . Splitting option one. Would like to see it reflected in the options as is. Would not be content with any reference purely to 1/cp.13. Would like it to be preservent currently as is.

Tadjikistan.

Support option 1 but ok to split as Switzerland said as well.

NZ. thinking pt of view ministers. Three options:

new process

conclude bap and ca, and start new process

just conclude bap ca.

new body or awg lca.

Trinidad . join Grenada, Marshall islands. Do not see the value in splitting what can be addressed in other parts of this doc.

Would like to have clarity what legal outcome means, which is different, would it be more valuable to put it explicitly. Under the convention or otherwise?

South Africa . Respond to two. Gambia raised a problem.

Reference to 1/cmp.7 is full ratifiable KP 2cp.

NZ . Lets dump Bali is option 1 interpreation. Another let's finish bali pursuant I/cp.13. Third finish Bali through decisions and then new legally binding instrument pursuant to art 17.

Saudi . X brings in important point. Various options should not be considered in a vacuum. In the context agreement 2cp. Decision of picking which option for our ministers depends on bullets in particular third bullet.

EU. we are not currently looking at the context. Agree with Mexico's interpretation of legally binding instrument. Option 3 looses the notion of binding and would not agree to just legal outcome.

Facilitator plural ref to tasks is clear. The document and tasks will never stand alone. I'm convinced that ministers would be informed by facts [relating to KP 2cp] at the time when decision is taken.

There are broadly those that want to have a final outcome of Bali and a group who see that beyond Bali we need do something more. Those who want to pursue Bali differ in what the outcome should be.

We should be abl to put something fwd.

China we are ready work.Options in 3 and 5 some sense moving to compromise. How you would see merger of bullets.

Option 3 combination of protocol as well as decision approach, just a middle ground. We should work in those lines. We are not just refining, we could try to get a sense of combining.

Grenada . [not sure if all of it is Grenada intervention] Clarification, what is the process going forward regarding this paper tasks basis. Start collapsing some of these options.Borrow words of famous rapper: ''everybody wants to go to heaven but nobody wants to die...'' You cannot go to heaven without dying .

Facilitator Thank you for that timely reminder.

Saudi . Emphasise package situation here. We were similar discussion in Bali. Discussions came to ''agreed outcome''. This is now 1/cp.13. Some developments since then, but part of the difficulty is the ambiguity. What happening with negotiations kp. Here [in Durban] here there is a chance to remove that ambiguity and it could be helpful.

Japan . How to do options has been discussed already for hours. Would ask the chair to make a clear options. Take into consideration the discussion that we have had here and take it to indaba. Continuing here does not produce more clear result. What is the nature of this paper. We are discussing paper that could lead to cop decision. Odd to see the last part 1.cp.17. pol declaration? why the reference in in para on content.

Facilitator : in response to the questions regarding process forward. Based on our discussions, despite the plea by China to narrow to compromise, I think parties at this time prefer that all options are presented to minsters in a manner that they can can deal with. We must do this in a more visual way.

We will have one final take at the paper, present it to ministers and see with Presidence when to indaba.

There is a ministerial indaba tonight, will be handeled in that indaba. Ref cmp 7. placeholders just to indicate these decisions do not happen in isolation.

Part on 'basis' move it up front. Part of the explanation.

US . Basis section could be confusing to ministers, not understand. Content and basis sections have a lot of overlap.

In post 2020 context none of this is very relevant. What does basis mean? Input into, imply the authority to enter into..? Might just be deleted.

Australia . do not have strong view. You could include already into the options the relevant basis you might find necessary.

China . Basis, most important is the Convention itself, including the KP. We would want this to be added as basis.

EU . US raised valid coern basis and content relation. Australia interesting solution. You know the views of the parties if you want to pursue.

Option 5 could be challenge in this respect. Pre and post 2020 phase, bases would need particularly careful consideration.

Gambia. Need to tell the ministers what the nrs .13 .16 etc mean.

Facilitator comments regarding the options for forum.

EU We would want there to be a clear option that that we see the work of LCA concluded here.

China clarification 1 bis. is bis alrternative. in addition to?

Facilitator . we can make a separate option. Timelines.

US . In the morning we thought we decided to put simply when does it start and when it ends. The options in the paper are still linked with the outcome. Find it very confusing. No start without legally binding outcome.

Grenada. In our recollection urgency was shared by all. We need to start now, and thought there was unanimous agreement on 2012. No dispute to our understanding.

China. Share confusion of my sister of the US. You call it lines but not very clear. Talking ending time. How possible to achieve by cop 18. unless pursuant t o cp 13 . If 18 refers to arrangements for period beyonnd 2020 not serious indication just 18. Agree with my sister need to have very clear timelines.

Need to distinguish 'complete end of bali' and the process we might or might not agree to 2016, 2017. Otherwise really very confusing. Try to separate the legal form.

Facilitator . was a 2013 proposal by the US. if I recall right? [yes, kept]

Grenada: AOSIS position is clear we want to launch negotiations in 2012.

India . Our choice is LCA extended. And we do not want parallel awgs. Do not favour option 2 awgs. Wait for the process to conclude .13 until start to develop arrangements for 2020 . Option 5, timeline correlated. Starting time will change. Starting time after other completed.

Australia.

Agree with US this part is about timing, not content. China comments regarding timeline depends on options. Timelines could be incorporated to the options. Loose separate section of timing. Also in LCA or new, would be more manageable for minister to navigate.

*-*-*-*-*

Durban climate conference (COP 17) 4

7.12.2011

The Indaba discussions were moved to ministerial level today in a group of approximately 60 Parties. The COP President announced she would nominate Ministerial facilitators for taking some of the remaining issues forward. Below notes from the discussion among Green COP participants in our breakfast meeting, the EU Presidency briefing to EP delegation this morning, as well as notes from EP side event on finance and COM briefing to MEPs in the afternoon. In the end incomplete notes of the ministerial Indabas [I was not able to be present for the first half hour of neither KP or LCA first discussions at Ministers levels].

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?@ Green breakfast with Wendel Trio CAN Europe

Wendel gave a short overview of the stakes and state of play regarding the negotiations from the NGO perspective. The main issue is regarding the legal architecture for the future climate framework. The main elements are amendments to Kyoto Protocol and a mandate to start negotiations for a new legally binding instrument to be concluded before the end of 2015. The EU negotiation position has been to put agreement on KP 2nd Commitment Period conditional to the second element. The NGOs do not agree with the conditionality, it is not convincing to say we want a legally binding architecture if we are at the same time prepared to tear down the existing framework.

The ambitious option is full legally binding KP 2CP, the political commitment being COP decisions with annexes on targets and rules, without amendment of the Protocol and no compliance regime. Until now it is still open which one of the two is the outcome. A particular concern is that in order to do fully ratifiable KP 2CP, Member States need to have credentials from their foreign ministers for the Protocol amendment and it seems that 2-3 EU MS still do not have such credentials.

The problem Parties are China, US and India, and for different reasons. China’s per capita emissions are higher than some Annex I parties. China’s position has been in favour of legally binding agreement but not internationally legally binding commitments for itself. However China already has legally binding domestic commitments. The Chinese position is driven by the blame game. Regarding the somewhat aggressive and dismissive comments of some EU ministers and the Commission regarding changes or not in Chinese position, Wendel said an EU China conflict will not be helpful. It is better to try to put pressure on China from within the G77.

India is very different. KP is clearly not important for India, although it might say so in order to not create distance between itself and the rest of G77/China. It has therefore nothing to gain and EU strategy does not have leverage to influence its position. India is genuinely worried that developed countries will more and more demands on its action, in addition to the targets it put forward in Copenhagen. On a per capita basis India is very different from China, Brazil or South Africa.

The US is driven purely on domestic agenda and wants to avoid at all cost a Republican attack due to any commitments made in the international climate negotiations. The negotiators have a mandate as small as it possibly could be. According to Wendel the only way to move them is to isolate them and see if Obama administration would risk to be blamed if a compromise emerges with China and India.

The second big issue is mitigation and ambition gap. The pledges are not likely to go up here. We want the EU to move to 30% and the loopholes to be closed. Problem with the carryover of AAU surplus is actually relevant to most Member States. EU has a -8% target and we are at -15% already. We need to push the EU to accept the African proposals which are still based on projected baselines but a step forward. In the worst case scenario the loopholes allow KP parties to increase their emissions rather than decrease them in the 2CP..

The third key issue is finance. We need innovative financing mechanisms on bunkers etc to be able to mobilise the USD 100 bn / year by 2020 that has been committed. The issue of global bunker levy has moved an important step forward with developing countries proposal on the table suggesting a global levy on shipping fuels, with the explicit mention that it have no net incident on developing countries (meaning that they would be compensated through a share of the revenues for any immediate costs related to its implementation). In the negotiations EU has been reported to try to delete the text of the LCA document. Single most important gestures that could be made to developing countries would be to start individual pledges to the Green Climate Fund.

Regarding Canada’s withdrawal from KP, Wendel explained that this would be to avoid penalties for non-compliance. On the other hand if Canada stays in, it will pose a serious challenge to the KP compliance regime, perhaps it is even better to have them out not to need to take that challenge. Canadian Greens explained that the only way to influence the bad Canadian positions is to bring it to public awareness that Canada is seriously damaging its international reputation.

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?@PRES briefing to the EP delegation (Wednesday 10.00-11.00)

The Polish secretary of state explained the EU priorities to the EP delegation and said that the work is progressing in the various small working groups as well as the numerous bilaterals the Presidency is conducting on behalf of the EU together with the Commission. She expressed that the meetings with major economies including China have not been very fruitful and was frustrated with the discrepancy in public and private.

Asked about the AAUs and whether EU is willing to compromise (and whether PL is representing EU position faithfully) the secretary of state was quite defensive and said that the Presidency will make proposal today for EU internal coordination and it will continue to be discussed tomorrow. She highlighted the position that there must be no discrimination of treatment of EU and non-EU Parties.

The Predidency did not think there would be a problem with credentials although she said she does not know of the possible red lines linked to such credentials that some Member States might have. Instead of unity of EU position she defended the differences on surplus AAUs by saying that EU is also divided on the issue unconditional KP 2CP…

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In the EP side-event on long term climate finance Sir Nicholas Stern reported on the work of the UN Sec Gen high level group on climate finance. He started out by explaining how the USD 100 bn commitment came about, how we got it to the story in Copenhagen. It was basically negotiated between the Ethiopian prime minister and the US, initially there was also a 50bn marker for 2015 and we had to allow for public and private sources. The 100 bn figure itself was also a compromise.

As regards the UN Sec General’s high level group, he said it was a group of people with a lot of expertise in finance, in fact half of the Member were ex-finance ministers. The basis was that the sources had to be innovative, in order to ensure additionality. There is no way to say what would have been the level of development funds for 2020 in the absence of climate funds to assess additionality. The group agreed it had to be something that focuses on the problem, instruments based on taxing the bad, the greenhouse gas emissions. The group did not worry too much if it was a price through market or a tax. Another criteria was to make proposals that help deal with investment risk. The sources should also not have incidence on developing countries and should form some compensation to developing countries to allow for the incidence on their activities.

In order for the rich countries to have incentive to raise the money, the group said half should stay in the country. For carbon tax the proposal was 90%. They proposed a modest carbon price of USD 25 in 2020, and Nichlas Stern noted that we are in trouble with the 2C goal if the price is not higher.

Stern explained that the group wanted something that could be scaled up as many of us thought 100 bn is on the low side. He said that the group had arguments in particular between Lagarde and Summers regarding recommendation for financial transaction tax, which remained unsolvable. However they managed to make progress on bringing forward suggestions based on carbon and carbon investment flows.

In addition to carbon tax / trading the group suggested mechanisms on aviation and maritime emissions and redirecting carbon subsidies. They suggested international financial institutions should be provided with more resources to mitigate risk of low carbon investments and explored carbon offsets and ways to generate private finance.

On the issue of how the money should be used, Stern reported that the group had tense discussions. While the topic was not strictly in the remit of the group’s mandate, guarantees on money being spent wisely will better convince ministers to introduce the measures. One recommendation was not to make a too rigid differentiation on mitigation and adaptation or development in the spending side. Many of the measures are interlinked unnecessary silos will reduce likelihood of the money being spent well. Stern said he does not mean additionality does not matter, but underlined his remarks are on the spending side.

Asked about how we should get to carbon price of USD 25 / ton, Stern said the only way is to tighten the cap.

Wendel Trio presented the NGO proposals on bunkers to raise innovative finance for GCF and contribute to the USD 100 bn. He also added that the NGO proposal is to scale up from fast start by adding 10 bn every year to the initial 10bn / annum fast start finance for 2010-2012.

He said that NGOs were happy that bunker levies were finally being seriously discussed, but expressed concern on the EU opposition to the ‘net incidence’ text. The Commission representative Stefan Agne replied that such details regarding revenues should be part of further negotiations but highlighted that differences [in wealth] between developing countries should also be reflected.

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?@COM briefing to EP delegation

Artur Runge-Metzger gave Members of EP Delegation quick overview of progress in the last 24hours, explaining that much of the work is still on-going at expert level in small groups. A new version of the LCA amalgamated document was issued Wednesday morning and while the text does not yet represent big compromises it has clearer options (attached). Much of that work relates to the implementation of the decisions made in Cancun, linked to adaptation, technology transfer, finance, etc. In the KP track the discussion still around QUELROs, possible midterm review, how to achieve as legal as possible avoidance of the gap between the commitment periods.

Last night and today the Indabas were convened at the level of senior negotiators to discuss KP ad the roadmap or mandate. There is some progress, the Presidency tabled a one pager which was later issued as two page document with more detail and options (also attached). It is still not good enough, the principles are not included and the ongoing KP track issues are not reflected in the bigger picture. There are several options, the strongest being the EU proposal which sticks out as the most demanding, expect some AOSIS proposals on dates

Most important discussions have been taking place in bilaterals, EU has been engaging in many bilaterals with LDCs, AOSIS, China, USA, India, Brazil..

Runge-Metzger said that middle ground has yet to emerge. He also warned that we might be in for some surprises at the COP /CMP plenaries still — the Russian proposal for amending the procedure under the Convention for graduating to Annex I is not progressing (the proposal is about allowing new transition economy Parties with potential hot air to be included in Annex I with the consequence of benefiting from targets allowing for hot air and its sale to Parties with eventual QUELRO commitments). The rumour has it that Russia is willing to push the issue to a vote at the plenary if it is not agreed before. Kazakstan has a similar proposal under the KP plenary regarding its target in Annex B that could also be pushed to a vote if there is no consensus.

Responding to Bas question about the information Polish Presidency made this morning about developing EU position on AAU on the basis of a Presidency proposal, Artur said there is no Polish proposal yet. He agreed that the issue needs to be discussed and resolved for the COP to be able to come to a decision Friday or Saturday.

The Commission clarified that the ratification of new targets in Annex B were not subject to the same procedure as the Protocol itself but would require passing through all the 27 Parliaments and the EP in a limited time to ensure continuity. He explained the options for how to ensure continuity, in particular through a COP decision. He said that the option of provisional application was problematic for one Member State and also for others would need a procedure similar to ratification and therefore not really saving any time.

He also said that what might appear surprising, some developing countries like Brazil, China, and South Africa have expressed some preference for a declaration [in bilaterals?]. The reason given that a declaration does not require consensus of the COP - which risks a possibility of a Russian blockage at plenary. EU preference is for a COP decision which makes it clear that it is agreed and accepted by all Parties. The second possible reason which is not put forward openly is of course that as it is seen in the context of the Roadmap, a declaration would allude to there being no COP decision engaging on a Roadmap for future legally binding instrument.

Regarding technology transfer and IPR, Artur said that the Cancun decision were progressing well to implementation and the remaining issues are not far from being completed here.

On IPR India has proposed a new agenda item, and COP presidency is consulting Parties on this in informal discussions. EU position is to say that beyond the discussions already on the LCA track, questions linked to IPR are discussed in other UN bodies and EU would not support opening a new agenda item.

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Indaba ministerial on KP agenda

[Missed the introduction by AWG KP chair and first speakers. Chair presented a slide with table of options, with options on numbers> QUELROs as single numbers in Durban, QUELROs as ranges in Durban and targets (%) in Durban, QUELROs later (+process), options on form: amendments to Annex B + full ratification, Amendments to Annex B + provisional applicatoin, decision in Durban, amendments finalised later, decision in Durban, no amendments, Declaration; and options on CP2 length: 5 years, 8 years with mid-term review of ambition, 8 years]Switzerland . KP coming to an end. We are ready to continue our efforts reducing emissions, sustaining developing countries contribution. Ready to contribute in the very useful slide, but to make this decision we need information on a bigger picture, to know sufficient coverage of emissions. Recognition of today's and tomorrow's realities of emissions is missing.Namibia minister. Negotiations based on 3 main tools

1) negotiators need to have a sufficient mandate to be guided

2) international rules. multelateralism guiding principle.

3) equity. ensure world resources are shared

KP very very important. Countries are impacted differently although same planet, have different responsibilities in addressing it.Looking at the time, we were supposed to act yesterday, find ourselves today. Need to also look at urgency. Science and equity need to guide us, KP very important and we must not disappoint world...Philippines. Indaba setting is a good platform to narrow diverging views, to spell and expand our red lines.Share Grenada views. Would be a disappointment after 5 years to relegate our for political declaration. Or decisions or unilateral decisions as outcomes. Need strong political form in the form adopting amendments to the KP 2CP. My country supports fully ratifiable amendment, expressed as QUELROs as single numbers. Not worthwhile to look at last 3 columns, not part of our mandate. Only first two are consistent with the mandate. Important to pursue 5 year period taking note of the low level of ambition. Locking into 8 years with low level ambition will not solve climate problem. Speak on behalf 7000 islands of the Philippines, vulnerable to most tropical countries.Egypt deputy minister: Wise to look at KP first. Rule based, science based regime gets my countrys full support. Equity is paramount. Referring to Grenada's intervention, there is a problem and my country is affected. Nile delta, food shortages, we are collectively unsafe. Climate change effects our development prospects in the future. We d not want to lock in low level of ambition. Support fully ratifiable 2CP of 5 years with no gap. Venezuela. first high level Indaba, we are here to try to get common ground. Happy to see friends around table, the same ones that helped Mexico to produce the outcome last year. KP 2 CP and something else. Kyoto + this is how we see this in a balanced way. We can not avoid difficult political choices and our responsibility. When I accepted his mandate to this meeting I said to my president we are confronting our responsibility for our very future, not speaking of only historical responsibility. We need to give political guidance in order that coherence happens between technical and political level. Lets help our techical staff to move and be able to agree.

We need to continue talking. talk with those that we have the biggest differences. We need to look beyond historical responsibilities. China, assistant foreign Minister Xie Zhenhua. Thank you for convening this informal stocktaking meeting. Honered to be here part of the 60 delegations. Seek to lend our full support to South Africa to make Durban success. Our colleagues have worked very hard and they have made good progress. Even in KP group there is good progress. Join colleagues in thanking you. We have now just 3 days. World is watching us and Durban. It is not isolated conference, but continuation of Bali Action Plan. Started under Bali roadmap.This is where we need to conclude Bali Roadmap. We share your view that the establishment 2 CP KP is very crucial to ensure success Durban conference. We must ensure continuity of negotiations that started over 20 years ago. Histo responsibility for succes and to ensure multilateral process of negotiation.

In the last days new issues have been raised. For all delegations should be realised that process follows honest approach in pursuing the negotiations, step by step approach. Previously 1994 and 1995 cop1 mandate initiated negotiation for instrument, completed in Kyoto Protocol adopted and entered into force 2005. We adopted Bali road map, now still stage negotiations. This year 2011 still 4th year of hte 1st commitment period, and next year is the last year of that period. Happy about Cancun agrement that there should be no gap. And this is what we are starting to see. In Durban we are just coming to implement that decision, make 2cp available beyond 2012 to ensure no gap. I think this is a process honest process of negotiatoins. My delegation, part of G77 China, we are a developing country. Victims of climate change share the voice of Philippines. Following a storm in the Philippines China suffers the same storm. We suffer like other developping country friends concerned about these extreme weather. First we need to ensure Durban succes with 2cp establishment and decision full operationalisation green climate fund and tech tansfer, capacity building and all the elements important to developing countries. Will support you in that.Zambia. Will refuse to be part of a declaration as outcome as not legally binding. Support ratifiable amendments to annex B KP and deep emissions cuts for not less than 40% compared to 1990. Look to convention track achieving legally binding comparable to KP, this is important to ensure that all developed countries take commitments. Tasks to be undertaken option 2 Bali Action Plan basis and Cancun agreement through legally binding documents. Support AWG LCA to be extended. On the timeline, option one adoption in the form of Protocol or other at COP 18. To colleagues seeking for lesser ambition: our countries are not separated by fortressess. Laissez faire attitude has claimed lives of our people, their communities devastated. Remind you of a woman in Africa who delivered on a tree baby due to extreme wheater. Australia: Reinforce points made. All seeking environmentally effective outcome. The chart put forward re KP options: difficulty is the discussion in isolation of what should be balanced package. KP has been very important, for the rules etc. Reality at the moment is that KP2cp will only cover 15-17% of global emissions. Emissions would continue to grow signifantly globally. That s why it is difficult to speak in isolation, we do need to deal with other matters and need to discuss wider more comprehensive mitigation commitments for all of the major emitters. That is necessary for environmentally effective outcome under the UNFCCC. CBDR needs reflect contemporary realities. Want to talk about the mitigation pledges counties put forward in Cancun agreements. Australia as one. Last year we have legislated to meet those pledges, how are other countries are doing in theirs? How do we MRV them, mitigaiotn and MRV very important parts. Norway. Wenezuela we know each other, eyes are upon us, we need is a sense of urgency. Act now, not in a distant future. We see it Ethiopia Somalia we see Bangladesh, need to act now. Faith of the Kyoto Protocol, lets be frank. Will be defined by EU. Only big entity. Gets support from NO and some others. Without the EU there will be no KP, there might be an Oslo protocol, completely without any meaning.

EU has come forward with a generous offer. Ready for 2 cp even if somEE do not make the same pledge. What we expect is some balance. Cannot be only focus on 15% of emission and no focus on 85% emissions outside KP. EU expects and what I expect is that major emitters outside come forward with a balanced proposal legally binding instrument all major emitters. Developed nations and those developing nations in the verge of being big emittors need to come forward. EU has made a generous proposal. Time to recognise positive Chinese comments in the media. Gambia. question of survival. LDCs chance not only to develop but to live hangs in the balance. Nauru. supports Grenada foreign minister. Not come to skirt around the issues. Fortunately we are not starting from scratch. We have KP we must preserve the robust accounting and rules. We support kp 2p + Durban mandate to conclude in 2012 not a replacement of KP. Failure of agreeing 2cp will unravel everything acieved for last 2 decades. Barbados not necessary that all fully agree with the outcome for there to be consensus. Have been fortunate to be at 3 previous COPs, have not heard anything new. apart from some saying KP 2cp might be left behind. Some countries are not delivering on their commitments, promises made are not delivered. We need some framework for policing those that do not. I hope conclusion here, really need progress. Notion of putting back is dangerous for us at the brink of extinction. Indonesia Optimism GCF. 2cp paraller progress LCA. Like to address the matrix. Indonesia prefers single number QUELRO, before end of 201 amendment of kp is a must to avoid gap we accept provisional application. We prefer 8 years with mid term review. Suggest we pledge ourselves to work. Conclude personal note.

We are sure of your deep understandign of current delicate issues. Urgent and critical time decision asap, state the trust all of us. Not need to consult at lenght or can convene a limited number of us to make progress. Maldives next 48 hours crucial. Urgency is felt. kp cp. EU willing to work is encourageing. Sure there are conditions, we have to discuss to see if we can agree. Legally bingind agreement LCA track we must get a mandate with a fixed timeline. 2020 is not acceptable for us. Will not negotiate on that timeline. Has to be much earlier. Give the parties a mandate to start work soon after the conclusion of the COP to reach it even next year. Nepal High time to deliver. We are one of the most vulnerable. Himalayas exposed. Need to limit well below 1,5c. LDC need special support. No gap. Legally binding based on BAP. Current mitigation pledges lead to 5 C with catastrophic impacts.Equador 2cp crucial is a must for credibility of multilateralism and international law, and for the balance we need. Must be robust in form and content. Russia Russian delegation supports your efforts to achieve meaningful deliverables in Durban. after COP clear vision and signal that countries has proceeded from preparatory stage to meaningful action. Time elapsing we would love to agee on a package. What are the decisions that have to be the building blocks. KP side we did not have too many options available. Underscore until now we do not know what countries of AI have explicitly concented to 2 cp as required art 21 Protocol. May expect ratification process take time. Elaborating decisions that could be building block to future regime. This decision in mind stems from Cancun. package almost agreed understanding. Important to garnish this package with the Roadmap that could clearly indicate perspectives for achievement on an agreement new instrument. Issue of possible form. Dec of conf parties? Future declaration. Legal form. Declarations would need to be left to hign level statements.[??]President. Appeal to ministers, time for national statements is over. Minsters we do not want to retreat, we want to move on the same pace as before.Saudi Arabia. Promised this form will continue till the end. G77 inist that there be no new text presented at the last minute. Support your efforts for comprehensive package all elements of BAP. You can count on us. Ready put single numbers as amendments to annex B to ratificaton asap. Has been the demand. Now they come to put certain conditions, I look KP adopting amendmt 3.9, has no conditions. It is an oblication without conditions. Conditions are very difficult for delegations to accept,. change convention. PNG . Commend EU coming forward. But balanced package required. Spain Like minister Grenada said, we need science based respons

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